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PAUL HEALD'S "RESOLVING PRIORITY
DISPUTES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
COLLATERAL": A COMMENT
Robert H. Rotstein*
INTRODUCTION
In Resolving Priority Disputes in Intellectual Property Collater-
al,' Paul Heald sheds light on a complex and seemingly arcane
area of the law-the conflicting priorities among holders of security
interests in intellectual property. Most topical is Professor Heald's
discussion of security interests in copyrighted material, a subject of
both recent case law2 and proposed legislation.3
As summarized more fully below, Heald's major thesis is that,
although section 205 of the Copyright Act of 1976' preempts
certain aspects of state law governing security interests in copy-
rights, it does not preempt all state law. In particular, Heald
believes that state laws governing the priorities between unperfect-
ed secured creditors, or between an unperfected secured creditor
and a trustee-in-bankruptcy, survive federal preemption. In this
regard, he criticizes the recent opinions in In Re Peregrine Enter-
tainment, Ltd.5 and AEG Acquisition Corp." because they hold
that the Copyright Act preempts state commercial codes purporting
* Partner, Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman, Beverly Hills, California. I wish to thank Steven
Fayne and Donald Karl for their valuable comments and suggestions.1Paul Heald, Resolving Priority Disputes in Intellectual Property Collateral, 1 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 135 (1993).
'See Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Zenith Prods. (In re AEG Acquisition Corp.),
127 B.R. 34 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991) (holding security interest in film is perfected under
United States Copyright Act, and not under Uniform Commercial Code); National Peregrine,
Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd.), 116 B.R. 194
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990) (Kozinski, J., sitting by designation) (holding federal recordation and
priority scheme of Copyright Act preempts any state priority scheme regarding security
interests in a copyright).
3 See Copyright Reform Act of 1993 § 301, H.R. 897, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)
(proposing, among other things, a dual federal and state system of recordation).
4 17 U.S.C. § 205 (1988).
5 Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 194.
a AEG, 127 B.R. at 34.
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to resolve the rights between a trustee-in-bankruptcy and an
unperfected secured creditor.
Given the current interest in security interests in copyrights, this
paper will limit its remarks to Heald's discussion of copyright law.
This paper first suggests, contrary to Professor Heald's conclusion,
that under section 205(d) of the Copyright Act of 1976,7 Congress
has indeed preempted state commercial law in a way consistent
with the holdings of Peregrine and AEG.
Second, the paper examines the practical considerations underly-
ing the decisions in Peregrine and AEG by describing how the cases
reflect longstanding practice among those engaged in giving and
taking security interests in copyrights. Third, this paper briefly
considers Peregrine and AEG in light of recent copyright "theory"
and suggests that criticism of those cases reflects a trend in
copyright law toward reassimilating a Romantic concept of
"authorship."
Finally, this paper addresses two issues Professor Heald does not
expressly mention, yet that bear on the nature of the current
system regulating security interests in copyrights: (1) the relation-
ship between a security interest in the intangible copyrights, on the
one hand, and in the tangible property in which the copyright is
embodied, on the other; and (2) the treatment of security interests
in the proceeds derived from a debtor's exploitation of its copy-
rights.
I. THE COPYRIGHT ACT AND CONFLICTING SECURITY INTERESTS
A. SUMMARY OF PEREGRINE AND OF PROFESSOR HEALD'S POSITION
In Peregrine,s a creditor savings and loan took a security interest
in the debtor's film library. The creditor filed a financing state-
ment with the California Secretary of State under the California
Commercial Code, but did not record its interests with the United
States Copyright Office under section 205 of the Copyright Act of
7 17 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1988).
8 116 B.R. at 194. BecauseAEG essentially adopted the reasoning in Peregrine (see AEG,
127 B.R. at 40-41, 43-44), I will focus my remarks on Peregrine.
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1976.9 The debtor filed a proceeding under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code. Invoking the applicable provisions of the Code,
the debtor-in-possession asserted a judicial lien on the copyrights.
In this way, the debtor sought to avoid the secured creditor's
interest on the ground that, by failing to record its security interest
with the Copyright Office, the creditor was unperfected and
therefore junior to the debtor-in-possession. 0
Judge Kozinski, sitting by designation, held that section 205 of
the Copyright Act preempts state law recordation and priority
systems. As a result, the secured creditor's filing in the state office
under the California Commercial Code was insufficient to perfect
its security interest in the debtor's copyrights. Moreover, as a
matter of bankruptcy law, the debtor-in-possession (tantamount to
a trustee-in-bankruptcy) would be deemed to have recorded its
interest with the Copyright Office. By virtue of such recordation,
the debtor-in-possession had priority under section 205(d) of the
Copyright Act as a judicial lien creditor who recorded in the
Copyright Office and took in good faith, without notice, and for
consideration.
Professor Heald does not reject the notion that federal copyright
law preempts much of state commercial law governing security
interests. He acknowledges that section 205(d) of the Copyright
Act settles two priority disputes between transferees of interest in
a copyright: "(1) when the first transferee files first in the
Copyright Office (first transferee wins); and (2) when a subsequent
transferee for value and in good faith files first in the Copyright
Office without notice of a prior unrecorded transfer (second
transferee wins)."1 Heald agrees that a state law system incon-
sistent with the foregoing scheme would be preempted by federal
copyright laws.
12
Nevertheless, Heald argues that Congress has left untouched
certain aspects relating to conflicting priorities. In particular,
Heald posits that the Copyright Act provides no express answer on
the issue of priority if neither transferee records, if the subsequent
17 U.S.C. § 205 (1988).
1 0Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 198.
Heald, supra note 1, at 139.
2 1d at 138.
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transferee is the trustee-in-bankruptcy, or if the copyright at issue
is unregistered. He reasons that, consequently, "a court would not
be justified in holding that in section 205 Congress has impliedly
preempted all Article 9 priority rules, especially those that do not
conflict with section 205.13 Thus, a court should apply state law
in deciding priorities between two unrecorded transfers, between an
unrecorded transfer and a trustee-in-bankruptcy, or where an
unregistered copyright is at issue.
The ramifications of Heald's position could be far-reaching.
Although the states have adopted Article 9 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code (or variants thereof) and thus now have relatively
uniform laws, presumably Heald would permit state legislatures to
amend their commercial codes to alter or vary the laws governing
priorities among unrecorded transfers of copyright interests.
Conceivably, fifty different state systems could coexist.
Heald criticizes Peregrine and AEG because, contrary to his own
conclusion, they hold that federal law does preempt state law rules
governing the conflicting interests of a trustee-in-bankruptcy and
a creditor who fails to record in the Copyright Office. Specifically,
he quarrels with the holding in Peregrine (and in AEG, which
followed Peregrine) that, as a matter of federal preemption, an
unperfected security interest cannot prevail as against a debtor-in-
possession, who under the Bankruptcy Code, enjoys the status of a
judicial lien creditor.1'
Heald finds Peregrine and AEG "highly suspect" in concluding
that the trustee-in-bankruptcy was deemed to have filed in the
Copyright Office.15 He notes that under the law of California and
most states, a judicial lien creditor (the analogue to the trustee-in-
bankruptcy) need not file in the United States Copyright Office as
a prerequisite to perfecting its lien on intellectual property, and
that Peregrine and AEG erred in declaring otherwise. According to
Heald, it follows that, because the trustee and the secured creditor
in Peregrine and AEG had conflicting interests as to which section
205(d) of the Copyright Act is silent, Article 9 of the Uniform
l 1d. at 138-39.
14 1 U.S.C. § 544(aX) (1988).
15 Heald, supra note 1, at 144.
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Commercial Code governs."
For Heald, the evil of Peregrine and AEG is that they deny the
states the right to "tinker with the priority relationship between
lien creditors and those who provide notice of a security interest by
filing with the state."7 But why should the states have the right
to "tinker" with such priority relationships? Professor Heald
proffers no policy reasons, relying instead on statutory construction
and case law. As discussed in the following subsection, however,
Heald's conclusions do not necessarily flow from the language of the
Copyright Act.
B. A REEXAMINATION OF SECTION 205
Heald's criticism of Peregrine and AEG rests on two premises,
each of which may be questioned. First, he posits that section
205(d) of the Copyright Act does not speak to who has priority in
the case of two unperfected creditors. Second, he states that,
because under state law a judgment creditor need not file with the
Copyright Office to perfect a judicial lien, Peregrine and AEG
erroneously found that the trustee-in-bankruptcy had filed with the
Copyright Office. However, neither of these premises inevitably
follows from the language of the Copyright Act or the case law.
1. Section 205(d) of the Copyright Act and Unrecorded Transac-
tions. Heald first argues that section 205(d) of the Copyright Act
does not establish priorities among unrecorded transactions, or
among unrecorded transactions and a trustee-in-bankruptcy.
However, it is not clear from the statutory language that this is so.
Rather, one could construe section 205(d) as implicitly providing
that, as between two unperfected secured creditors, the creditor
whose transaction was executed first prevails.
The first sentence of section 205(d) sets forth the situations in
which the transfer executed first will always prevail, irrespective
of whether the second transfer was recorded or executed in good
faith, without notice, or for consideration. Under this first
6 Id at 146. This conclusion would not, under Professor Heald's view, mandate a
different result under Peregrine, since the secured creditor's failure to record in the
Copyright Office meant that it had not perfected its interest even under the California
Commercial Code, which itself required a federal filing. Id. at 147.17 Id. at 148.
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sentence, when the first transfer is recorded in the Copyright Office
first, the first transferee always wins. On this, there is no
disagreement.
However, Professor Heald's interpretation of the second sentence
of section 205(d) is open to question. The second sentence provides
that a second transfer prevails "if recorded first [as required by
section 205], and if taken in good faith, for valuable consideration
or on the basis of a binding promise to pay royalties, and without
notice of the earlier transfer."" The second sentence of section
205(d) can be interpreted to prescribe the only instances where the
second transaction can prevail over the first: (1) if the second
transaction is recorded first; (2) if it is taken without notice of the
first transaction; (3) if it is for valuable consideration; and (4) if it
is made in good faith. Where any of these conditions are absent,
the second transfer cannot prevail.
Significantly, according to this construction, recordation is an
absolute precondition for the second transferee to have priority. So,
an unrecorded second transaction could never prevail as against an
unrecorded prior transaction. 19 If this is the case, then contrary
to Professor Heald's argument, section 205(d) at least implicitly
resolves the issue as to the priority of conflicting unrecorded
transfers: a first unrecorded transaction has priority over a second
unrecorded transaction (or over a second recorded transaction
entered into with notice, in bad faith, or without consideration).
Any state law to the contrary would be preempted. For example,
the states could not, consistent with section 205(d), pass a statute
giving an unrecorded second transferee priority over an unrecorded
first transferee, merely because the second transferee took without
notice, in good faith, and for consideration. Such a reading of
section 205(d) would therefore mean that federal law governs the
fact situation presented in Peregrine and AEG, and that those cases
18 17 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1988).
Indeed, Professor Heald recognizes that, by negative inference, section 205(d) provides
that where there is notice, bad faith, or lack of consideration, the second transaction can
never prevail over an earlier unrecorded transaction. Heald, supra note 1, at 143 n.46. In
drawing this negative inference, however, he does not mention the additional requirement
that to have priority, the second transfer must also be recorded.
172 [Vol. 1:167
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were decided correctly as they relate to preemption. 0
2. Perfection by a Trustee-in-Bankruptcy of Its Hypothetical
Judicial Lien in a Copyright. While the foregoing interpretation of
section 205(d) would mean that the Peregrine court properly applied
federal copyright law in reaching its decision, it does not necessari-
ly mean that Judge Kozinski correctly held that a trustee-in-
bankruptcy must prevail over an earlier unperfected secured
creditor. Rather, to have priority, the trustee must satisfy the
conditions of the second sentence of section 205(d), including
recordation of its interest with the Copyright Office. Peregrine held
that, as a matter of bankruptcy law, the trustee would be deemed
to have exercised all rights necessary to perfect its lien, which
included recordation in the Copyright Office.21
Professor Heald finds it problematic that the courts in Peregrine
and AEG so easily found that the tirustee-in-bankruptcy would be
deemed to have recorded in the Copyright Office. Recall that the
trustee-in-bankruptcy enjoys the status of a judgment lienor.
Heald reasons that, because a judgment lienor as a matter of state
law need not perfect its lien by filing with the Copyright Office,
Peregrine erred in holding that the trustee-in-bankruptcy had made
such a filing.
The problem is, however, that Peregrine stands for the proposi-
tion that, notwithstanding state law to the contrary, as a matter of
federal copyright law under section 205(a), a judgment lienor must
file in the Copyright Office to perfect its lien. Judge Kozinski
evidently believed that state law cannot determine when a
judgment lienor has perfected its interest in a copyright. For this
reason, to say that a judgment lienor is perfected as a matter of
state law is beside the point: perfection requires a federal filing.
And according to bankruptcy law, if the trustee must file under the
Copyright Act to perfect its lien, it will be deemed to have done so.
In sum, Professor Heald's reliance on state law regarding perfection
of a judgment lien in a copyright does not really address the
o I recognize that the above interpretation of section 205(d) is not inevitable. Indeed, one
could object that the construction unjustifiably inserts the word "only" in front of the word
"i' in the second sentence of section 205(d). Nevertheless, the interpretation is certainly
plausible and thus deserves further analysis.
" National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Peregrine Entertain-
ment, Ltd.), 116 B.R. 194, 207 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990).
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preemption issue raised in Peregrine.
Moreover, even if Professor Heald is right that a judgment lienor
is not required to record in the Copyright Office to perfect its lien,
Peregrine was still correctly decided. Judge Kozinski writes:
"Under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1), not only is the debtor-in-possession
given the rights of a judicial lien creditor, it is also deemed to have
exercised those rights in their entirety."22 Such a concept is not
merely Judge Kozinski's creation out of whole cloth. Rather,
Peregrine cites the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Sampsell v. Straub'
for that proposition. Thus, irrespective of whether a judicial lien
creditor must file with the Copyright Office, there is little question
that it may (i.e., has the right to do so), and as a matter of
bankruptcy law, will be deemed to have exercised this right.2,
In summary, neither case law nor statutory construction
inevitably leads to the conclusion that Peregrine is incorrectly
decided. As a result, pragmatic and theoretical considerations more
directly come into play. The next section of this paper discusses
certain of those considerations.2
2 Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 207 n.19.
"194 F.2d 228, 231 (9th Cir. 1951) ([T]he trustee is given all the rights which a creditor
with a lien by legal or equitable proceedings would enjoy."), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 927 (1952).
Peregrine cites the Ninth Circuit at 116 B.R. 207 n.19.
u Professor Heald does not address the language in Peregrine regarding the rights of a
trustee. Rather, he focuses on language inAEG, regarding what a judicial lien creditor must
do under state law. See Official Unsecured Creditor's Comm. v. Zenith Prods. (In re AEG
Acquisition Corp.), 127 B.R. 34, 43 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991) (discussing how the status of a
lien creditor is determined by the specific language of the state statute at issue). Yet, the
latter language does not end the inquiry since a trustee-in-bankruptcy may take advantage
of all rights a judicial lien creditor could have, whether necessary or not to perfect a lien.
"One might also question Heald's statement, admittedly held by others (e.g., Judith A.
Gilbert & William P. Streeter, Film Industry Bankruptcy: Securing the Right to Payment
Before It Happens, 26 BEV. HILLS B. ASSN. J. 175, 177 (1992) (discussing film industry
bankruptcy and security mechanisms for creditors, and providing critical analysis of
Peregrine)), that interests in unregistered works may not, under the Copyright Act, be
recorded, and that the Copyright Act thus does not preempt state laws governing security
interests in unregistered copyrights. Section 205 of the Copyright Act does not exactly
provide that unregistered copyrights may not be recorded. Rather, section 205(a) provides
that any transfer of an interest may be recorded. 17 U.S.C. § 205(a) (1988). By its terms,
this provision would seem to include a transfer of an interest in an unregistered copyright.
Section 205(c) merely provides that, unless the copyright is registered, recordation in the
Copyright Office does not provide constructive notice of the transfer.
One could argue, therefore, that Congress provided for recordation of unregistered
copyrights, but as an incentive to registration, provided that such recordation would not give
174
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II. OBSERVATIONS ON PRACTICE AND THEORY
A. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
As Heald's article and other commentary demonstrate, Peregrine
and AEG have generated a certain amount of controversy and
criticism.26 From a practical standpoint, it is difficult to under-
stand why. On its face, the Peregrine decision may seem harsh in
depriving a secured creditor-which at least attempted to perfect
its interest through properly filing a financing statement with the
state--of its priority vis-k-vis the debtor-in-possession. On closer
examination, however, the result is not so harsh as it first appears.
Broadly, all systems of priority will in certain instances result in
unfortunate results for one party or another. For example, under
section 9-312(5) of the Uniform Commercial Code, a second
transferee who files first has priority over the earlier transferee,
even where the subsequent transferee has notice of the first
transfer.27  Obviously, the first transferee will question the
fairness of permitting the subsequent transferee to have priority.
More particularly, the secured creditor in Peregrine failed to
follow established practice in the motion picture industry, according
to which secured creditors have traditionally recorded their
interests first and foremost with the Copyright Office, and as a
matter of prudence, in the appropriate state office as well.28
constructive notice of the transfer. This construction makes sense if a subsequent transferee
who searched the records of the Copyright Office would be deemed to have actual notice of
a transfer in an unregistered copyright. If so, then Congress has not been silent on the
question of unregistered copyrights, and an argument might be made that federal law would
preempt state laws that purport to govern priority disputes over interests in unregistered
copyrights.
" See H.R. 897, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (proposing to overrule Peregrine and
institute a dual system of recordation as to security interests in copyright); Bamberger et al,
Preliminary Report of the ABA Task Force on Security Interests in Intellectual Property
(ABA Business Law Section 1992) (on file with author); Gilbert & Streeter, supra note 25,
at 176-79.
7 E.g., CAL. COM. CODE § 9312(5) (West 1990).
"E.g., Gary Concoff, Motion Picture Secured Transactions Under the Uniform
Commercial Code: Problems in Perfection, 13 UCLA L. REV. 1214, 1219-20 (1966) (advising
the secured creditor to record in all jurisdictions whose law might control the secured
transaction); Steven E. Fayne, Copyright As Collateral, L.A. COUNTY B. ASSN. J. (1984). See
Observations and Concerns of The American Film Marketing Association, The Affiliated
Financial Institutions of The American Film Marketing Association, The Directors Guild of
1993]
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Obviously, if the creditor in Peregrine had followed this practice, it
would not have lost its priority vis-&-vis the debtor-in-possession.
The Peregrine holding therefore did not frustrate commercial
expectations and is not objectionable on that ground.
Peregrine not only reflects longstanding practice, but is also
consistent with the scheme preferred by those most closely involved
with secured transactions in copyrighted material. Creditors,
debtors, and interested third parties alike generally seem to favor
a broadly preemptive federal system governing recordation and
priority of security interests in copyrights.
For example, a group of financial institutions, motion picture
producers and distributors, and entertainment industry labor
organizations has recently taken a position favoring the holding in
Peregrine.' The motion picture industry (as well as the record
industry and the computer software industry) is, it may be said,
"work" oriented rather than "debtor" oriented. For example,
creditors with a security interest in a film focus on the work itself
as the means of identifying conflicting security interests.30 Thus:
Motion pictures are works of enormous complexity.
They rarely, if ever, consist of a single right devel-
oped by a lone party for exploitation in a discrete
market. Instead, motion pictures consist of a collage
of rights, often owned by different parties, at differ-
ent times, for exploitation in a variety of media.
Any motion picture, therefore, may have a host of
security interests which affect it. How do interested
parties in the motion picture business determine who
has a security interest in a particular motion picture
and what the security interest covers?
America, The Screen Actors Guild, The Writers Guild of America, West with Respect to
Section 101 of the Copyright Reform Act of 1993, at 6 (June 8, 1993) [hereinafter AFMA] (on
file with the American Film Marketing Association) (noting that the decisions in Peregrine
and AEG confirm "long-standing" and "well-understood" practice).
AFMA, supra note 28.
'L at 6-7.
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Under the current system, the answer is easy:
search the record in the Copyright Office. The
Copyright Office maintains a work-based register. 1
State recording systems, however, are "debtor" based.32 In a state
filing system, knowing the identity of the work does not help;
rather, to conduct a search, one must know both the identity of the
debtor and the debtor's domicile. The proliferation of possible
debtors with different domiciles leads many involved in motion
picture financing to believe that a state system of recordation, i.e.,
recordation under the Uniform Commercial Code, would increase
expense and confusion.'
Lending institutions favor a federalized system of recordation
because they believe that such a system affords them more
certainty as to who has rights in a particular work. Conversely,
the motion picture producers believe that the uncertainty of a
debtor-based state law system could hinder their ability to borrow
by making lenders more reluctant to lend. The Writers, Directors,
and Screen Actors Guilds, which take security interests in motion
pictures to secure payment of compensation for their members'
performances, also support the present system, perhaps out of a
sense of cautious conservatism.34
In short, critics of Peregrine may not have much of a constituency
among those who actually participate in secured transactions.
While the motion picture industry may not comprise the full
panoply of entities with an interest in recordation and priority in
secured transactions in copyrighted material, that industry
certainly plays a prominent role.
In reaching his conclusions, Professor Heald largely ignores these
broad contours of commercial practice.' As a basic proposition,
31 Id.
"Id.
"Id. at 5.
3 AFMA, supra note 28, at 5.
5In fairness, it does not seem to be the object of Heald's article to discuss whether
federal law should be amended to provide for recordation of such security interests, or
alternatively, whether existing state law is inadequate. Nonetheless, in light of the
preference in the commercial world for a federal system of recordation and priority, it is
undoubtedly important to ask whether, in the long run, a state system would be adequate.
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broad federal preemption would serve the interests of those in the
business of giving and taking security interests in copyright.
Indeed, copyright exists to encourage the production and dissemina-
tion of works of authorship.' This policy clearly has federal (and
constitutional) dimensions. An important segment of those
involved in copyright-related financing fear that a state-based
system could actually impede the production and dissemination of
copyrighted works by making financing less available. For this
reason, permitting the states to alter priority schemes (even in the
narrow area of unrecorded interests) could arguably interfere with
the purposes of the federal copyright laws."7 If this is so, the
decisions in Peregrine and AEG are defensible.
B. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
While the question of priority in security interests might seem
relatively immune to theoretical discussion, the antipathy that
some have to the concept of federal preemption may in fact have
interesting theoretical underpinnings. In particular, the preference
for a state law debtor-based system of recordation arguably reflects
an adherence to a concept of authorship that has its genesis in
Romantic thought and that has recently become the focus of much
discussion.
Peter Jaszi and others have noted that the concept of "author-
ship" is a construct that flowered during the ascendancy of
Romantic thought in the nineteenth century.3" During the
nineteenth century, the Romantics considered the author-genius
the central object of literature. For example, Wordsworth wrote
that "[ploetry is produced by a man of more than usual organic
sensibility." 9 According to this Romantic vision of authorship, the
work that was original reflected the author's genius and enjoyed a
' Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of 'Authorship," 1991
DuKE L.J. 455, 459 (1991).
" See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (holding that
Florida statute prohibiting use of direct molding process to duplicate unpatented boat hulls
conflicts with federal patent laws and is preempted).
38 Jaszi, supra note 36, at 463.
39William Wordsworth, Preface to the Second Edition of Lyrical Ballads, in CRITICAL
THEORY SINCE PLATO 435 (H. Adams ed., 1971).
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privileged relationship vis-&-vis the higher arts.4°
In more modem times, copyright law has rejected this Romantic
notion of authorship, focusing instead on the copyright system as
a method of encouraging dissemination of valuable works and not
as a means of rewarding "authors."41 Nonetheless, very recently,
the Romantic notion of the author has reemerged in copyright, for
example, in debates about moral rights.42
I suggest (though I do not direct this point against Professor
Heald) that antagonism toward a federalized system of recordation
can be viewed as yet another manifestation of the reemergence of
the concept of author in copyright. As discussed above, the state
indexing system relating to security interests is debtor based. Very
often, the debtor will be the "author" for the purposes of copyright.
Deference to state recordation systems therefore means, in some
sense, deference to authorship.
By contrast, the federal work-based system is antagonistic to the
concept of "author." A search of the federal filing system, though
it may reveal individuals or entities claiming rights in a work,
nevertheless focuses on the "work." The question of who authored
the work is secondary. In this way, the difference between the
federal system of recordation and state commercial indexing
systems reflects a longstanding tension between "author" and
"work."
The relevance of such theoretical discussions to what appears to
be a mundane form of commercial transaction may seem question-
able. Yet historically, many decisions in copyright law have
' Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53(1884), reflects how copyright law
during the nineteenth century assimilated Romantic thought. In Burrow-Giles, the Supreme
Court for the first time held that copyright extended to photographs. In concluding that a
photographer was an "author," the Court stated: 'The third finding of fact says, in regard
to the photograph in question, that it is a 'useful, new, harmonious, characteristic, and
graceful picture, and that plaintiff made the [photograph]... entirely from his own original
mental conception, to which he gave visible form ...... Id. at 60. This language bespeaks
a decidedly Romantic approach to authorship and the copyrighted work.
41 In Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951), the issue
was whether mezzotint engravings of paintings of the old masters were entitled to copyright
protection. In holding these engravings copyrightable, Judge Frank eliminated the Romantic
idea of author from the determination of originality. Now, '[n]o matter how poor artistically
the 'author's' addition, it is enough if it be his own." Id. at 103. As noted by Jaszi, supra
note 36, and others, Romantic thought has recently begun to reemerge in copyright law.
'2 Jaszi, supra note 36, at 485, 492.
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obscured underlying tensions between the role of the author and
the notion of the work as a form of speech that has value to the
public.'3 In considering how a system of recordation and priority
should function, it is important to pause and examine whether such
traditional tensions underlie the various arguments for and against
a particular system."
III. PROBLEMS WITH PEREGRINE AND AEG
Although the above discussion defends Peregrine and AEG to a
certain extent, aspects of the opinions relating to conflicting priority
(not discussed by Professor Heald) are indeed problematic. More
specifically, the cases raise at least two additional and interesting
questions concerning: (1) the relationship between a creditor's
security interest in the intangible copyright, on the one hand, and
in the tangible property in which the copyright is embodied, on the
other; and (2) the rules governing security interests in the proceeds
from copyrighted works.
A. INTANGIBLE COPYRIGHT, TANGIBLE PROPERTY
A first issue apparently not considered in Peregrine is whether,
notwithstanding the creditor's unperfected interest in the intangi-
ble copyright, the creditor's Article 9 filing gave it a security
interest in the tangible property in which the copyrights were
embodied (i.e., in the actual reels of film from which the motion
pictures could be exhibited, or in the negatives from which the
motion pictures could be reproduced). This question is not
academic and indeed could ameliorate the impact of Peregrine on
a secured creditor.
In Peregrine, the security at issue was a film library. Although
the secured creditor lost its interest in the copyrights, it still could
" See, e.g., id. at 485.96 (discussing how this tension permeates such seemingly technical
issues as aworks-made-for.hire' and copyright renewal and reversion).
" Given Professor Heald's recognition of federal preemption of important areas of
copyright, this discussion of theory is not primarily addressed to his Article. However, one
could certainly argue that the proponents of the Copyright Reform Act of 1993, H.R. 897,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), who argue for a dual federal and state system of recordation,
may be influenced by ingrained preferences for authorship.
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have had bargaining power as against the debtor-in-possession if
it could have retained priority as to the tangible property and
thereby deprived the debtor-in-possession of access to this property
(the negatives or prints).
The Peregrine court demonstrated some willingness to extend its
holding to more than just pure security interests in a copyright.
This might mean, for the court, that federal copyright law would
preempt state law in connection with the tangible property in
which the copyright is embodied.' However, one of the most
firmly ingrained doctrines in copyright law is that the ownership
of a copyright is distinct from the material object in which the work
is embodied." Thus, under section 202 of the Copyright Act,47
transfer of the material object does not transfer the copyright."
Therefore, in Peregrine, the creditor's state law Article 9 filing
perfected its security interest in the tangible property in which the
copyright was embodied even though the creditor's interest in the
copyright was unperfected. Consequently, the secured creditor in
Peregrine should have had priority as against the trustee-in-
bankruptcy in connection with the tangible property. Such a result
would give a creditor significant clout, especially where the creditor
has possession of the collateral. 49 By depriving the trustee-in-
bankruptcy of the tangible property, a secured creditor might
hinder the trustee's ability to exploit the copyright and in that way
force the trustee to settle with the creditor.
Could the secured creditor in Peregrine have deprived the debtor-
in-possession of access to the tangible property and thereby
thwarted the debtor's attempt to exploit the copyright? The answer
is unclear. In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,60 the
defendant, Reid, owned the exclusive copyright for three-dimension-
"See Gilbert & Streeter, supra note 25, at 181 (noting that because Peregrine holds that
security interests in proceeds from copyrighted works must be recorded in the Copyright
Office, one might also argue-though this result would be incorrect-that the Copyright Act
preempts state law governing a security interest in the celluloid).
417 U.S.C. § 202 (1988).
47 Id.
" Importantly, this provision is in the same chapter as section 205(d), which governs
priority disputes.
"For example, in the motion picture industry, the laboratory often has a security
interest in, and possession of, the negative of a particular motion picture.
' 1992 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 26,860 (D.D.C. October 16, 1991).
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al reproductions of a sculpture. Plaintiff CCNV owned and
possessed the tangible sculpture. Reid desired to make a mold of
the sculpture to capitalize on his exclusive three-dimensional
reproduction rights, but CCNV refused to give him access. Without
much discussion and citing only cases involving easements to real
property, the court held that Reid did not have to create an original
work of art to exploit his copyright. Instead, Reid had a limited
possessory right-in the nature of an implied easement of necessi-
ty-to cause a master mold to be made of the sculpture.5'
By analogy, a trustee-in-bankruptcy who has priority in a
copyright but not in the tangible property arguably could have a
similar right of access to the tangible property. Yet, the brief
opinion in CCNV rests on virtually no authority. Moreover, in
Peregrine, the secured creditor is in a somewhat stronger equitable
position than the owner of the sculpture in CCNV. The right to
exclude may be the only thing that gives value to the secured
creditor's interest in the tangible property. This is not the case in
CCNV in which the sculpture had value independent of any right
to exclude. The point is that the scope of rights in tangible
property could, as a practical matter, have a significant impact on
a court's determination of conflicting priorities. Neither Peregrine
nor AEG considered this issue.
B. SECURED INTERESTS IN THE PROCEEDS DERIVED FROM COPY-
RIGHTS
One of the most interesting aspects of Peregrine is Judge
Kozinski's conclusion that the creditor's security interest in the
proceeds derived from the debtor's film library (i.e., in the accounts
receivable derived from exploitation of the copyrights) constituted
the type of security interest, which as a matter of federal preemp-
tion, is subject to recordation in the Copyright Office.52 It has
been noted that this conclusion is questionable, since "income" from
a copyright is not, under section 106 of the Copyright Act,' one
I11d. at 1 25,027.
National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Peregrine Entertain-
ment, Ltd.), 116 B.R. 194, 199 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990) (Kozinski, J., sitting by designation).
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1990).
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of the exclusive rights granted to a copyright owner." Therefore,
one could persuasively argue that Peregrine's holding is incorrect
in this regard, and that state law appropriately governs recordation
and priorities of security interests in accounts receivable derived
from exploitation of the copyright.
Indeed, the practical considerations behind a nationwide system
of copyright recordation do not necessarily apply to security
interests in proceeds derived from the copyright. Given the diverse
entities and varied rights at issue,5 a creditor taking a security
interest in the copyright itself must rely on a "work-based" system
of recordation. The same does not apply to proceeds derived from
those interests. Because such proceeds are ordinarily paid to the
debtor (who thus has possession of the proceeds), there is usually
no need to conduct duplicative searches of state indices. Rather,
the Uniform Commercial Code's debtor-based system of recordation
seems to serve the interest of the secured creditor, whose main
concern is that revenues received by the debtor are unencumbered.
Nonetheless, motion picture financiers can make a strong
counter-argument that Peregrine correctly decided the issue. A
security interest in the copyright of a film may not be worth much
as collateral if the debtor has granted another party a security
interest in the proceeds derived from distribution of the film.
Therefore, a work-based system of recordation and indexing as it
relates to proceeds from a copyright could arguably serve the
interests of certainty in connection with copyrights as collateral.
In short, Peregrine's application of the federal preemption
doctrine may be overbroad in connection with security interests in
proceeds derived from copyright. The statutory language affords
less support for its decision as to preemption, and the policies
favoring one system over another are not clear.
CONCLUSION
Professor Heald's article is laudable in its attempt to provide
guidance to courts in practical situations involving disagreements
about priority disputes over intellectual property collateral. More
Gilbert & Streeter, supra note 25, at 180-81.58See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
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broadly, Heald focuses on an issue too often ignored in copyright
literature, namely, the interrelationship between state and federal
law.
The recent controversy over the Peregrine decision, however, has
resulted in negative reactions that, upon analysis, are often difficult
to explain in light of the apparent preference for a federalized
system of recordation or priority by parties actually involved in
commercial transactions. To most copyright practitioners, Peregrine
was neither unexpected nor incorrect. Given recent proposals that
would radically change the current system, a debate on the issue
of priority and recordation, to which Professor Heald's Article
makes a notable contribution, is certainly warranted. One only
hopes that such a debate will take place before any new legislation
is precipitously enacted.
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